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Dance may be one of the world’s oldest art forms, but it is a relatively 
recent entrant into the sphere of copyright law—and remains something of 
an afterthought amongst copyright lawyers and scholars alike. For copyright 
scholars, at least, that should change with the publication of Anthea Kraut’s 
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT: RACE, GENDER, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN DANCE. Kraut 
performs a fascinating exploration of the evolution of choreographic 
copyright—sweeping, political, polemical—that should leave no one in 
doubt as to the normative significance of choreography as a subject matter 
of copyright law and policy. Nor should doubt remain as to the political 
significance of copyright within the realm of choreography. Choreographic 
copyright, Kraut persuades us, is a key site for the negotiation of subject-
hood and the navigation of shifting power flows. Through carefully 
researched and beautifully narrated case studies that reveal the role of race 
and gender in the allocation of intellectual property rights, Kraut weaves a 
compelling historical and socio-cultural account of copyright’s emergence 
and exploitation on the stages and in the studios of 19th-21st century 
America. 
A scholar of dance, Kraut contributes to an increasingly interdisciplinary 
conversation around the legal structures of the intellectual property system, 
challenging the traditional formal account of copyright law with its facially 
neutral concepts of authorship, originality, ownership, and economic 
incentive. Bringing to bear lessons from dance, performance and cultural 
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studies, critical race scholarship, and critical legal studies, Kraut expertly 
deconstructs the edifice of copyright law to reveal the gendered and 
racialized assumptions of value and social hierarchy on which its 
foundations lie. Perfectly adept at explaining the law and its development 
through statute, regulation, and case law, Kraut confidently engages with 
the legal scholarship on the nature of copyright while also seamlessly 
drawing on a rich body of literature on dance history and philosophy, 
anthropology and ethnography. The contribution that this book makes to the 
field of dance and theatre studies has already received worthy 
recognition1—but it is the interdisciplinary light that it sheds on the legal 
theorizing of copyright in dance and beyond with which I am most 
impressed. In particular, Kraut’s book should be welcomed as an important 
contribution to legal scholarship in the blossoming areas of copyright and 
choreography; intellectual property, race and gender; and intellectual 
property’s negative spaces.  
In the first regard, the book adds greatly to a surprisingly small body of 
academic scholarship grappling with copyright law’s treatment of 
choreographic works.2 Coming from a legal perspective, such works 
typically focus on the significant doctrinal challenges involved in, for 
example, parsing protectable original expression from public domain 
“social dance steps and simple routines;” separating the choreographic 
“work” from the “system, method or mode of operation” that copyright 
ought not to protect; adequately fixing the choreographic work in a stable, 
material form that allows the work to be protected, registered and readily 
identifiable; and untangling the ownership claims of dance companies, 
choreographers, and performers. Each of these challenges presents 
fascinating practical and policy questions for legal scholars to examine, 
pressing not just at the subtle incoherencies of choreographic copyright but 
revealing the uncertainties inherent in copyright law at large. Kraut 
recognizes these doctrinal challenges as she tackles particular cases, but 
refuses to reduce them to interesting questions of law: rather, they play at 
the peripheries of a much larger challenge—revealing the inherently 
political nature of recognizing, defining, allocating, and circumscribing 
copyright in choreographic works.  
In this political vein, Kraut’s book also represents a major contribution to 
the legal scholarship at the intersection of intellectual property, race, and 
gender. This vital area of critical concern has emerged, over the past decade 
or two, to occupy a central place in critical legal approaches to copyright, 
radically unsettling the long-held notion that its privileges apply equally 
across cultural, geographic, racial, gender, and economic divides to anyone 
who can objectively lay claim to the label of “original author.” Beginning 
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with the work of scholars such as K.J. Greene (who is thanked in this book) 
and Rosemary Coombe (whose work Kraut describes as instrumental to her 
thinking) (p. 35),3 a community of critical scholars has shown that the law’s 
labels are differentially bestowed upon certain creators and genres of 
creative expression depending on the identity of the author(s), the perceived 
value of the work within the dominant culture, and the social context from 
which the author speaks.4 Of course, it should be no surprise that racial and 
gender inequalities permeate copyright law as they do any other area of our 
law and society, subordinating some voices for the valorization, 
amplification, and economic benefit of others. What Kraut demonstrates, 
through her examination of the ebbs and flows of copyright in 
choreography, however, is the extent to which the recognition or denial of 
copyright has always depended on the dancer or choreographer’s “position 
in a raced, gendered and classed hierarchy, and on the historical conditions 
in which they made, and made claims on, their dances” (p. xiii). Nuanced in 
its telling but simple in its essence, Kraut’s argument is that “choreographic 
copyright emerged out [and so retains] the same racialized logic of property 
that has persistently treated some bodies as fungible commodities and 
others as possessive individuals” (p. xviii). Through one choreographer’s 
story after another, Kraut tells us how, “although race and gender rarely 
surfaced as explicit factors in dancers’ pursuit of copyright protection or in 
the law’s uneven bestowal of that protection, choreographic copyright has 
served to consolidate and to contest racial and gendered power” (p. xiii).    
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT should also be received as a welcome 
addition to the so-called “negative space” literature: the growing body of 
academic work that examines what happens in creative communities when 
intellectual property protection is absent, whether in law or in practice.5 
From the perspective of the legal scholar, the purpose of these forays into 
different and often marginalized communities of creative practice is often to 
unsettle assumptions about the incentive structures established through law, 
and to explore how these map onto (or fail to map onto) people’s actual 
decision-making about what and how to create, or shared norms around 
when and how to copy (or not). Kraut’s exposition reveals the extent to 
which the dance world—whether of late nineteenth century theatres, early 
twentieth century stages, or twenty-first century streets—offers a perfect 
example of how creativity thrives and norms of sharing develop in the 
general absence of formalized legal claims over—or recognition of—
expressive works as such. Nonetheless, the denial of copyright to particular 
creative communities and particular actors within or at the margins of those 
communities remains subject to powerful critique as a mode of 
“invisibilization” (pp. ix-x).6 At the same time, Kraut acknowledges and 
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warns of the way in which the vesting of copyright—particularly in the 
embodied choreographic expression of the dancer—threatens to exacerbate 
the kind of objectification and commodification to which gendered and 
racialized bodies have historically been subjected.   
Thus, with the natural balance of the proverbial ballerina, Kraut tip toes 
along the narrow line that many legal commentators struggle to hold. Kraut 
succeeds, to my mind, where others have faltered: at once and convincingly 
condemning the denial of recognition that the refusal of intellectual 
property rights can represent, while sustaining a critical skepticism of the 
proprietary mode through which such recognition manifests and is 
operationalized in the marketplace. What emerges is a complex tale: a 
celebration of ownership in its connection with personhood, combined with 
a measured wariness of property in its connection with alienability and the 
conditions of capitalist exchange. The line she draws between the discourse 
of intellectual property rights and the empowerment of African American 
performers, for example, explicitly proceeds along the same path of 
principled pragmatism taken by critical race theorist Patricia Williams with 
respect to the discourse of rights in general (p. 131).7 Rather than arguing 
for or against choreographic copyright or legal reform, Kraut contends only 
and importantly that “copyright and choreography productively illuminate 
one another and the workings of race and gender in American dance” (p. 5).  
The book is divided into five chapters with an introduction and a coda. The 
Introduction, entitled “Dance Plus Copyright,” acquaints the reader with 
copyright’s tentative presence in the world of dance, and with the dance 
world’s tentative embrace of copyright. While acknowledging the 
problematic (sometimes even farcical) (p. 2)8 nature of efforts to own 
physical movement in the digital age, Kraut points the reader firmly 
towards the racial dynamics of appropriation and ownership, insisting from 
the outset that it is insufficient to simply dismiss choreographic copyright as 
either folly or futile. Rather, the challenge is to recognize that “[q]uestions 
of who possesses the rights to which movement, of who is authorized to 
borrow from whom, and of who profits from the circulation of dance are all 
entangled in the legacies of racial injustice” (p. 2). The Introduction is 
worth reading in its own right for its concise but surprisingly 
comprehensive overview of relevant debates in copyright theory (from 
public domain and free culture critiques of copyright’s expansion to 
concerns about its “Euro-modernist” origins and Western Enlightenment 
underpinnings) (p. 7), as well as its survey of raced and gendered 
conceptions of property (from labour and personhood theories to “whiteness 
as property”) (p. 27),9 and conceptions of materiality (commodification, 
embodiment and corporeality) in respect of both property and dance.  
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With this complex ground-work laid, Kraut embarks, in Chapters 1-5, to 
explore choreographic copyright case studies, drawing on a “combination of 
traditional performance sources and traditional legal sources,” to examine 
“how dance-makers with various degrees of privilege, working in the genres 
of modern dance, ballet, tap and jazz at various historical moments, 
engaged with the discourse and legal apparatus of intellectual property law” 
(p. 41). In telling these stories, Kraut mines them for illuminating lessons on 
“the ways dancers both participate in and resist the commodification of their 
embodied work, the stakes involved in that participation and resistance, and 
the effects of race and gender on both” (p. 41).   
Chapter 1 relays the experience of a white, female modern dancer, Loïe 
Fuller, as she sought to claim ownership of her “stolen” “Serpentine Dance” 
(p. 64),10 culminating in the 1892 case of Fuller v. Bemiss.11 The case is 
cited quite frequently in the choreography context for the derisive manner in 
which Fuller’s claim was dismissed by the court as falling short of the 
requirements of “dramatic composition.” Indeed, Judge Lacombe concluded 
that the “mere mechanical movements” of Fuller conveyed “no other idea 
than that a comely woman is illustrating the poetry of motion in a singularly 
graceful fashion.” The idea was “pleasing” but “hardly…dramatic” (p. 73). 
Kraut observes the gendered implications of the decision, noting how 
gracefulness and visual pleasure are attached to the female dancing body as 
object, while denying her “interiority” and “status as an authorial subject 
entitled to ownership” (p. 74).12 True to form, however, Kraut does not start 
or end her analysis there, but adds further layers of contradiction, 
introducing new tensions just as the more obvious conclusions were 
beginning to solidify. She notes, for example, that the “Serpentine Dance” 
was not the result of de novo origination but rather borrowed from Indian 
“nautch” dancing, introduced to the West through colonial cultural flows. 
When “white Western bodies” become the privileged interpreters and 
masters of Oriental dance, she contends, they lay claim to “Eastern ‘raw 
materials’ through their choreographic practice” (p. 63). With the disavowal 
of antecedents and the arrogation of proclaimed “creative genius” and 
“novelty,” Fuller is not presented simply as subordinated female subject, 
but also as privileged subject “claim[ing] the status of the white Romantic 
artist” (p. 65) and thereby seeking “to signal her distance from the chorus 
girls, skirt dancers, and Nautch dancers of the commercial stage” (p. 66) 
Kraut charts Fuller’s continued pursuit of intellectual property rights to 
“elevate her station,” navigating the “patriarchal organization of the mixed-
race commercial stage” (pp. 80-81). Ultimately, Kraut concludes that 
Fuller’s turn to the legal apparatus “must be seen at one and the same time 
The IP Law Book Review 25 
as an act of gendered resistance against a patriarchal system and an 
assertion of racial privilege within a system of white dominance” (p. 90).  
A similar narrative approach guides the reader through each subsequent 
chapter. The themes, tensions and interpretations that Kraut presents are 
constantly twisting and turning in on themselves, resisting the reader’s 
confident grasp, refusing to simplify the intersectionality of their subjects or 
the shifting, contextual nature of power. Chapter 2 delves into the 
relationship between race and property from the other side, exploring the 
efforts of Johnny Hudgins, an African American blackface comic 
pantomimist, to first defend himself against a breach of contract claim by 
denying his originality or individuality as a performer, and then to assert 
himself as an owner of copyright over his original act a few years later. 
Mining the contradiction, Kraut observes: “The irony of viewing Hudgins 
as a commodity that speaks and of viewing that speech as an affirmation of 
his personhood is that his speech…on some level reinforced the commodity 
status of his dancing body” (p. 125) In Chapter 3, Kraut examines how 
notions of property were both refuted and reinvented amongst African 
American dancers of the 1930s and 40s. Referencing the work of legal 
scholars such as Boatema Boateng and Yochai Benkler, (p. 157)13 Kraut 
argues that a shared tradition of “stealing steps” amongst African American 
vernacular dancers, combined with codes and conventions that governed 
borrowing, reveals “the ways in which notions of intellectual property play 
out in and around practices that the law refuses to recognize” (p. 164).  
1940s and ’50s Broadway is the focus of Chapter 4, which tracks the battle 
for choreographers’ copyright waged by white women such as Hannah 
Holm (who successfully registered the choreographic score for “Kiss Me 
Kate) and Agnes de Mille (the choreographer of “Oklahoma!”, whose 
advocacy later paved the way for the inclusion of choreography in the 1976 
Copyright Act). Their “success” is not, however, the full story. In her telling 
of the tale, Kraut emphasizes that “granting the choreographer intellectual 
property rights necessitates suppressing the non-autonomous and non-
original aspects of the creative process: its collaborations, its borrowings, 
and vitally, its dependence on the labour of racialized others” (p. 197). She 
then adds to the story Faith Dane’s 1962 common law copyright claim in 
the musical “Gypsy,” dismissed because her performance of “bumps, 
grinds, [and] pelvic contractions” could not rise to “the status of a property 
right.”14 By juxtaposing these case studies, Kraut underscores how 
decisions about copyrightability (and so access to “the rights of possessive 
individualism”) (p. 216) are rife with distinctions between high and low art, 
intellectual and physical labour, moral virtue and morally suspect sexuality.  
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The final chapter provides a thorough account of the two major 
choreography copyright cases post-1976: one that upheld the infringement 
claim of the George Ballanchine estate;15 and the other that denied the 
ownership and infringement claim of Martha Graham’s estate.16 Having 
emphasized the embodied nature of the choreographic work throughout the 
book, Kraut tugs on this string, asking, “what does the irrevocable loss of 
the choreographer’s body [in death] mean for the figure of the author and 
for the afterlife of the choreographic work?” (p. 221). She beautifully 
captures the significance of copyright’s romantic author trope, noting that 
after the literal deaths of two great American dance icons, “what was 
implicitly on trial in their copyright lawsuits…was nothing less than the 
choreographer-as-genius” (p. 228).  Perhaps it ought not to surprise us, then, 
that it was the male genius who persisted as possessive individual post-
mortem, “entitled to the historically white masculine privilege of propertied 
personhood” (p. 262).   
If the racialized and gendered dynamics and power flows of choreographic 
copyright were beginning to seem clear, however, a final twist is presented 
in the Coda, which explores the controversy around African American pop 
star Beyoncé’s evident copying, in her “Countdown” music video, of 
Belgian choreographer De Keersmaeker’s acclaimed modern dance “Rosas 
danst Rosas.” This offers the opportunity for Kraut to break from her U.S.-
frame, panning out to transnational dimensions of cross-border cultural 
flows, and the implications of choreography’s digital circulation. In a 
controversy involving parties at “opposing poles” in the contemporary 
dance landscape, it might have been tempting to present this twist as an 
optimistic turn: the empowered black female performing artist successfully 
appropriating white, avant-garde art, thereby “invert[ing] the historical 
pattern of acclaimed white artists taking from non-white dancers” (p. 268). 
The tale could have been one of racial and gender progress, revealing the 
power of art, in the internet age, to unsettle social hierarchies on the world 
stage. (pp. xvii-xviii) Resisting such a tidy final act, however, Kraut instead 
invites us to consider how the critical response to Beyoncé’s appropriations 
reveals continuing anxieties around the appropriate flow of choreographic 
traffic (pp. 265-266). Beyoncé’s reproduction (“re-embodiment”) (p. 276) 
of the choreography within commercial “global pop culture” (“coded 
black”) (p. 274), was “a tacit attenuation of white privilege,” which could 
be reclaimed only by reasserting authorial control. Having accused Beyoncé 
of “stealing,” De Keersmaeker’s decision to run a “Rosas Remix Project” 
and invite the public to upload their own versions of the choreography does 
not read, to Kraut, as a concession to the post-proprietary circulation of 
digitized dance in a participatory online environment: paradoxically, 
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perhaps, it looks more like an alternative copyright claim: “an attempt to 
regulate choreography’s reproduction and to separate out the right kind of 
circulation from the wrong” (p. 280).  
The picture Kraut paints, in the telling of these stories, is not ultimately one 
of progress, or even evolution, but one about the intractability of race and 
gender as hierarchizing constructions that continuously regulate the role of 
author and the privilege of proprietorship.   
Most of the choreography copyright cases examined in Kraut’s book and 
outlined above have made appearances elsewhere in the existing literature 
on copyright in choreographic works. Perhaps most notably, interesting 
accounts of an overlapping array of cases, similarly focused on emphasizing 
the privileging of whiteness and the presumed masculinity of authorship are 
provided by Caroline Picart in her excellent book, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY AND COPYRIGHT IN AMERICAN DANCE.17 While I would 
have appreciated a more carefully articulated explanation of the 
commonalities and differences between Picart’s and Kraut’s account of this 
legal history,18 I found both to be valuable and much needed contributions 
to the landscape of critical copyright theory. Indeed, I hope that Kraut’s 
book and Picart’s represent the start of a new wave of critical and 
interdisciplinary work in this field. I have argued elsewhere that the 
increasing number of controversies around choreographic “appropriation” 
in popular culture, such as those levelled against Beyoncé’s music videos, 
raises the specter of choreography as a new front in digital copyright wars.19 
Whether or not that proves to be true, there is no question that 
choreographic copyright offers up a fertile terrain within which to explore 
the contours of copyright law, challenging and rethinking how the law 
constructs and values the author, authorship, and the work. Far from 
competing over the same academic territory, there is plenty of room here for 
many more voices to enter the fray. 
As for Kraut’s voice, it is possible that her prose will be a little off-putting 
to some, straying as it occasionally does from the richly poetic to the 
potentially opaque. Readers familiar with the terminology, theoretical 
constructs, jargon and style of writing in socio-cultural and gender studies 
will undoubtedly feel more at home than those used to the typical legal 
academic terrain. Certainly, the writing can be dense, and the book is not a 
quick and easy read. But the reader is rewarded for her persistence. After 
all, Kraut’s objective is not to simplify the role of copyright, race or gender 
in the stories she is telling, but to convince the reader of their complex 
interplay. She does so in a way that seems almost to revel in their context-
specific contradictions. Embracing the complexities and exposing the 
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contradictions, Kraut offers a deeply nuanced account of a tangled “knot of 
recurrent issues: raced and gendered hierarchies in the theatrical 
marketplace; white women’s complication relationship to property rights; 
legacies of ownership of black bodies and appropriation of non-white labor; 
copyright as a discourse of domination and of resistance; the contradictions 
of self-ownership; and the tension between dance’s ephemerality and its 
reproducibility.” (p. xvii)  
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT is an illuminating book about 
copyright’s complicated engagement with choreographic expression in the 
United States, written “from a critical dance studies perspective that 
foregrounds race and gender” (p. xvii). It deserves a thoughtful reading by a 
wide audience within the IP academy, but will be of particular interest to 
anyone whose work brings a critical or interdisciplinary lens to bear on 
issues of copyrightability, authorship, ownership, equality, and the 
circulation of ideas within and across creative communities.   
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